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Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy had the 
same assessment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War rivalry 
that dominated world politics in the latter half of the 20 th 
century: that its implacable hostility, mounting military strength, 
and positive ideological appeal posed a fundamental threat to the 
security of the United States. Both accepted the basic goals of 
the Truman administration's containment strategy. However, the 
two presidents differed in their assessments of the extent of the 
Soviet threat, and in their judgments about how best to counter 
it. This led to quite different approaches to U.S. national security 
during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.  
To Eisenhower, national security encompassed more than just 
the physical defense of the homeland. It also meant protecting 
the country's way of life, basic values, economic system, and 
domestic institutions. Increasing military expenditures without 
bounds so as to counter the Soviet challenge posed two dangers. 
First, Eisenhower was concerned about bankrupting the U.S. 
economy. He believed that the United States must not overtax its 
resources in the effort to maintain military superiority; in fact, he 
felt that wrecking the U.S. economy would be a major victory for 
the Soviets. Second, Eisenhower thought that increased security 
spending and overgrowth of military institutions could turn the 
United States into a “garrison state,” curtailing democracy and 
freedom.  
In his quest to achieve security, keep the United States solvent, 
and guard its values and personal freedoms from encroachments 
of an overarching state, Eisenhower resolved to limit the growth 
of military expenditures. He agreed that the Soviet threat in 
Europe was real and that Soviet expansion must be deterred, but 
he disagreed with Truman that a further U.S. military build-up 
was needed to counter the projected threat of Soviet nuclear 
capability. Instead, Eisenhower correctly considered the U.S.-
Soviet competition as a long-term proposition. He reasoned that 
Soviet leaders would not act irrationally and seek a military 
conflict with the United States because that would bring ruin to 
their own country. Therefore, greater efficiency in defense 
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spending could and must be achieved.  
The direct outcome of Eisenhower's policy was budget cuts to 
numerous military programs. His objective was to establish a 
level of defense spending that was sustainable in the long run 
and would not threaten fiscal solvency or turn the United States 
into a garrison state. To achieve this goal, Eisenhower 
increasingly relied on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet (and 
Chinese) aggression. His main guiding principle was that a 
conflict, no matter how grave, should not lead a people to do 
away with what they are trying to protect in the first place. This 
principle has enormous resonance after Sept. 11.  
In contrast to the Truman administration, Eisenhower also 
attached greater importance to U.S. allies. His reasoning was 
that as the European countries grew stronger and became more 
capable of defending themselves from the Soviets, the United 
States would be in a position to limit its defense expenditures 
and lower troop levels overseas. Eisenhower also accorded 
greater weight to the role of psychological warfare, public 
diplomacy, and propaganda in the broader Cold War strategy. He 
was convinced that this war could not be won by military means 
alone, but that such a fundamentally ideological competition 
required courting world opinion and highlighting the strengths 
and appeal of the American system over the Soviet one.  
Kennedy's national security strategy differed from Eisenhower's 
in a number of ways. First, Kennedy believed that it was crucial 
to bolster U.S. defenses and rebuild military superiority over the 
Soviets, which he alleged had been lost during the Eisenhower 
years. Kennedy felt that more, not less, military spending was 
needed, because the United States needed to enhance its military 
capabilities and execute the Cold War more vigorously.  
Like Eisenhower, Kennedy dreaded the possibility of mutual 
destruction that would ensue from any nuclear war with the 
Soviet Union. Unlike Eisenhower, however, he concluded that the 
full range of U.S. non-nuclear capabilities should be expanded. 
This would allow the United States to tailor its responses to each 
kind and level of threat. In contrast to the all-or-nothing 
straightjacket imposed by Eisenhower's emphasis on the policy of 
massive retaliation, Kennedy put forth the flexible response 
doctrine, by which the United States would be in a position to 
counter the Soviet threat on multiple levels.  
The direct policy outcome of Kennedy's strategy was increased 
defense spending. This was made possible in part by the then 
dominant Keynesian economic philosophy, which emphasized the 
positive role of government intervention in the economy. This 
stood in sharp contrast to Eisenhower's conservative worldview, 
which emphasized budget discipline and fiscal solvency. Kennedy 
believed that the American economy could absorb increased 
government and defense expenditures without negative 
consequences.  
Kennedy also advocated an activist U.S. policy toward the “Third 
World.” Convinced that the primary scene of the struggle 
between the United States and Soviet Union had shifted to newly 
independent countries, Kennedy made the battle for the 
developing world a priority in the Cold War strategy. This meant 
that the United States would try to gain allies among such 
countries, hence adopting a more tolerant and friendly attitude to 
these newly independent states. America would also fight wars 
by proxy, if necessary.  
The distinctive features of Kennedy's national security strategy 
emanated mostly from a heightened threat perception. This in 
part had to do with the emergence of China as an increasingly 
menacing communist adversary. But it also resulted from the 
administration's evaluation that the United States had fallen 
behind the Soviets, in terms of both military capability and the 
struggle for the hearts and minds of the Third World.  
Kennedy concluded that the United States not only needed to 
spend more on defense, but also that it had to be more attuned 
to the socio-economic conditions in developing countries. As such 
ills seemed to fuel the communist appeal, he believed that the 
administration should use economic and social programs to spur 
modernization, alleviate poverty, and address educational and 
health needs in the Third World. The result was a number of 
high-profile international programs and incentives such as the 
Peace Corps.  
How best to respond to the fundamental threat posed by an 
ideological and military rival was the overriding concern of the 
two U.S. presidents. Eisenhower and Kennedy differed in their 
assessment of the resources available for fighting the Cold War, 
the importance of different parts of the world, and the right mix 
of military and other types of state spending. Working within a 
broad consensus on U.S. strategic goals during perhaps the most 
dangerous phase of the Cold War, the two administrations 
differed in tactical priorities. However, both saw the conflict as a 
long-term struggle that entailed not only military, but also 
political, economic and ideological competition. Each president 
developed his own response for the main objective of winning the 
Cold War.  
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